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Suppose we are about to enter an era of increasing technological unemployment. What 
implications does this have for society? Two distinct ethical/social issues would seem to arise. 
The first is one of distributive justice: how will the (presumed) efficiency gains from automated 
labour be distributed through society? The second is one of personal fulfillment and meaning: if 
people no longer have to work, what will they do with their lives? In this article, I set aside the 
first issue and focus on the second. In doing so, I make three arguments. First, I argue that there 
are good reasons to embrace non-work and that these reasons become more compelling in an era 
of technological unemployment. Second, I argue that the technological advances that make 
widespread technological unemployment possible could still threaten or undermine human 
flourishing and meaning, especially if (as is to be expected) they do not remain confined to the 
economic sphere. And third, I argue that this threat could be contained if we adopt an integrative 
approach to our relationship with technology. In advancing these arguments, I draw on three 
distinct literatures: (i) the literature on technological unemployment and workplace automation; 
(ii) the antiwork critique — which I argue gives reasons to embrace technological 
unemployment; and (iii) the philosophical debate about the conditions for meaning in life — 
which I argue gives reasons for concern. 
Abstract 
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 1. Introduction 
 Suppose the most extreme predictions regarding technological unemployment 
come to fruition: automating technologies takeover almost all forms of human labour. 
But suppose also that everyone shares in the productive gains. What happens then? Will 
our lives be filled with meaningful activity, or will we be merely passive recipients of 
the benefits of technology? In this article, I argue that there is cause for optimism, but 
only if we prioritise and develop the right kinds of technology and we relate to these 
technologies in the right way. 
 
 The main argument can be simply stated: Although there are reasons to worry 
about the societal impacts of technological unemployment, there are also reasons to 
embrace it. The so-called antiwork critique allows us to see the myriad ways in which 
our lives could be improved by substituting robotic labour for human labour: we would 
be free to pursue our own conception of the good life; our health and well-being could 
be enhanced; and we could rid ourselves of the drudgery, coercion and degradation of 
many forms of work. At the same time, the philosophical understanding of what it takes 
to live a meaningful life shows us the various ways in which the automation of labour 
could rob us of meaningfulness. This is true across a number of plausible theories of 
meaning, and should give us some reason for concern. But it may be possible to 
mitigate these concerns by harnessing technology in the right way. In particular, if we 
pursued increased integration with technology, not increased externalisation. 
 
 The argument builds over four main sections. First, I clarify the concept of work 
and explain why widespread technological unemployment is something we need to take 
seriously. Second, I introduce the so-called antiwork critique, noting how it highlights 
both the intrinsic badness and opportunity costs of work, and arguing that it is 
considerably more persuasive in an era of rapid technological advance. Third, I 
investigate the philosophical literature on meaning in life and make the case for thinking 
that technological unemployment threatens meaning. And fourth, I argue that this leads 
to a (mild) endorsement of an integrationist approach to technology. 
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 2. Will Technological Unemployment Happen? 
 This article is about work and the threat of technological unemployment. It would 
help if we had a firmer grasp on these two concepts. I start with “work”. It is 
notoriously difficult to define “work” in a manner that both covers all the phenomena of 
interest, and avoids begging the question as to its desirability (Frayne 2015, 17-23. 
Consider Bertrand Russell’s famous and oft-quoted definition (2004): 
 
“Work is of two kinds: first, altering the position of matter at or near the earth’s 
surface relatively to other such matter; second, telling other people to do so. The 
first kind is unpleasant and ill paid; the second is pleasant and highly paid.” 
 
Although there is a delightful insouciance to this, it seems both over-inclusive and 
value-laden. Russell is appealing to a scientific definition in describing work of the first 
kind, and he is assuming that such work is always unpleasant. He is appealing to a 
purely managerial/consultative conception of other types of work and assuming them all 
to be well paid. This seems both unhelpful and untrue. 
 
 How can we avoid these definitional problems? There is no ideal solution, but I 
propose the following as a plausible definition of work, which should suffice for the 
purposes of the present discussion: 
 
Work: The performance of some act or skill (cognitive, emotional, physical etc.) 
in return for economic reward, or in the ultimate hope of receiving some such 
reward. 
 
This definition is quite broad. It covers a range of potential activities: from the hard 
labour of the farm worker, to the pencil-pushing of the accountant and everything in 
between. It also covers a wide range of potential rewards: from traditional wages and 
salaries to other reciprocal benefits. It explicitly includes forms of  “unpaid 
employment”. Thus, for example, entrepreneurial work, unpaid internships and 
apprenticeships are included within my definition because, although they are not done 
in return for immediate economic reward, they are done in the hope of ultimately 
receiving some such reward. 
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 Despite this broadness, I think the definition avoids being overly-inclusive 
because it links the performance of the skill to the receipt of some sort of economic 
reward. Thus, it avoids classifying everything we do as work. There are two potentially 
controversial consequences of this. The first is that the definition excludes certain types 
of care-work or domestic work, traditionally performed by women, that have gone 
without economic reward. It is not my intention to downplay the value of such work, or 
to dispute its classification as ‘work’, but I think the exclusion is justified because the 
present inquiry is concerned with how technological unemployment improves or 
disimproves things with respect to the current status quo. The lack of economic reward 
for domestic labour is part of the current status quo and so not directly relevant to the 
argument I wish to make (though the impact of technology outside the labour market 
will not be ignored).  It may also exclude historical practices like subsistence farming in 
feudal societies or slavery that many would classify as ‘work’ (perhaps the exemplary 
forms of objectionable work).1 These practices could be included if you loosen up the 
definition of the instrumental gains that are tied to the performance of the skill. But, 
again, seeking to include them may not be necessary given the focus of the present 
inquiry. We are concerned with the forms of work that dominate in contemporary 
capitalistic societies and the potential shift away from these forms of work because of 
technological advance. In this respect, I think the proposed definition does capture the 
core phenomenon of interest and it doesn’t beg the question by simply assuming that 
such work is, by definition, “bad”. The definition is silent on this issue. 
 
 So much for work, what about technological unemployment? I define that as the 
replacement of human workers, engaging in work as defined above, by technological 
alternatives (machines, computer programs, robots and so forth). Such technological 
unemployment is a long-standing feature of the economy. Famously, machines have 
been used to supplement or replace agricultural or manufacturing labour. More recently, 
with the growth of artificial intelligence and robotics, they have begun to replace 
cognitive and emotional labour. This leads some economists to refer to this as “the 
second machine age” (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014).  
 
 In discussing technological unemployment, so-defined, one must distinguish 
between short-term and long-term versions of the phenomenon. To date, technological 
unemployment has not caused any long-term economy-wide crisis. Displaced workers 
                                                           
1 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for drawing this problem to my attention. 
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(or, at least, future generations of workers) have always found other forms of work 
(Autor 2015a). Thus, most forms of historical technological unemployment have been 
short-term. The phenomenon of interest in this article is the long-term structural version 
of technological unemployment, i.e. a version in which displaced workers, and 
subsequent generations of workers, cannot find alternative forms of work.  
 
 This type of technological unemployment has become a serious matter of concern 
in recent years.2  The goal of this article is not to defend the credibility of this concern. 
Rather, the goal is to assume that technological unemployment is going to happen and 
to consider its social and ethical implications. Nevertheless, it is worth getting some 
sense of the case in favour of technological unemployment. Doing so serves two 
purposes: It helps to justify the present inquiry, and it highlights the various 
technological trends that might facilitate such structural unemployment. This is 
particularly important since I will be arguing in section 4 that these trends will impact 
on our non-work lives as well.  
 
 The case for technological unemployment looks something like this: 
 
(1) If technology is replacing more and more forms of human labour, and if there 
are fewer and fewer alternative forms of work for humans to go to, then there will 
be technological unemployment. 
 
(2) Technology is replacing more and more forms of human labour, and is doing 
so in a way that results in fewer and fewer forms of alternative work for humans. 
 
(3) Therefore, there will be technological unemployment. 
 
The first premise is pretty uncontroversial. It states an obvious causal connection 
between replacement by technology, a narrowing field of employment opportunities, 
and the increase in unemployment. The second premise is problematic. It has two 
                                                           
2 A number of books, some quite alarmist and pessimistic (Keen 2015; Carr 2015), some more cautious 
and optimistic (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012 & 2014; Ford 2009 & 2015; Pistono 2012; Cowen 2013; 
Kaplan 2015; Rifkin 1997 & 2014), have been published arguing that ours is an age of increasing 
technological unemployment. These books have been complemented by research papers highlighting the 
rise of automation and the increasing share of income being taken by capital in Western economies (Frey 
and Osborne 2013; Fleck, Glaser and Sprague 2011; ILO 2013; Pratt 2015; Sachs, Benzell & LaGarda 
2015). These have in turn been complemented by the work of a number of leading journalists and 
economic opinion writers (Packer 2013; Krugman 2012 & 2013). 
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components. Its first component can be defended by appealing to enumerative examples 
of technologies that are replacing human labour (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014; Ford 
2015; and Kaplan 2015). It can also be supported by appealing to some trends in the key 
economic indicators that suggest that technology is responsible for an increasing 
amount of economic output (ILO 2013; Ford 2015). 
 
 The main problem with premise (2) is its second component which commits the 
Luddite fallacy3 (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014). This is the fallacy of believing that 
replacement by technology necessarily narrows the field of employment opportunities. 
This is a fallacy for both empirical and theoretical reasons (Autor 2015a, 2015b & 
Forthcoming). Since the dawn of the industrial revolution machines have been replacing 
workers and yet workers have always found somewhere else to go. Defenders of this 
view argue that machines complement human labour, they never completely replace it 
(Autor 2015a). The modern case for technological unemployment must overcome this 
Luddite fallacy. And there are a number of plausible rebuttals. Four, in particular, stand 
out among defenders of technological unemployment (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014).4  
 
 First, they point to the inelastic demand problem. There may be limits to how 
much of particular good or service is ever demanded and this could have a negative 
impact on jobs no matter how much the machines complement human workers. A clear 
example of this is the demand for labour in agriculture and manufacturing. Increased 
machine productivity has not led to increased demand for human labour in those 
industries. Even those who are sceptical of technological unemployment concede this 
example, but argue that it is merely one among many and that the ultimate impact of 
technology depends greatly on the particular labour market (Autor 2015a). 
 
 Second, they point to the outpacing problem. The Luddite fallacy assumes that 
people will always be able to retrain and reskill themselves (or that future generations 
will be able to do so) at a rate that cannot be matched by improvements in technology. 
But this may no longer be true. Many now argue that improvements in technology are 
                                                           
3 This can also be referred to as the lump of labour fallacy, i.e. the fallacy of believing that there is a fixed 
lump of labour out there to be distributed among human workers. 
4 Brynjolfsson and McAfee also mention a fifth: the possible creation of android robots, i.e. perfect 
technological replicas of humans, only cheaper, more compliant and more efficient. This might be an 
apotheosis of the current technological trends. But some argue that it is a mistake to focus on human-like 
machines; it is the fact that machines are not human-like that makes them a displacement threat to human 
workers (Kaplan 2015). 
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exponential (Kurzweil 2006; Ridley 2011; Agar 2015). If it takes several years to retrain 
a worker (or 25-30 years to educate them from scratch), that may no longer be enough 
to keep pace.  
 
 This is connected to a third problem, which we can call the historical data 
problem. This suggests that any empirical support for the Luddite fallacy could stem 
entirely from observing the relatively linear portion of an exponential growth curve in 
technological advancement. In other words, the reason why we haven’t yet seen long-
term structural unemployment is because we have yet to see what happens when 
technological advances really start to take off (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014).  
 
 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly for this article, they point to the winner 
takes all problem. There are two key trends in the modern information economy. The 
first is that an increasing number of goods and services are being digitised (with the 
advent of 3D printing, this now includes physical goods). This allows for replication at 
near zero marginal cost (Rifkin 2014). A second key trend is the existence of globalised 
networks for the distribution of goods and services. This is obviously true of digital 
goods and services, which can be distributed via the internet. But it is also increasingly 
true of non-digital goods, which can rely on vastly improved communication and 
transport networks for near-global distribution. These two trends have led to more and 
more “winner takes all” or “superstar’ markets in which being the second (or third or 
fourth…) best provider of a good or service is not enough: the income tends to flow to 
one dominant participant (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Keen 2015). Services like 
Facebook, Youtube, Google and Amazon dominate particular markets thanks to 
globalised networks and cheap marginal costs. The fact that the existing infrastructure 
makes winner takes all markets more common has devastating implications for long-
term employment. If it takes less labour input to capture an entire market — even a new 
one — then new markets won’t translate into increased levels of employment. The fact 
that technology allows for such superstar markets has important implications for what 
we do outside of work. I return to this point in section 4. 
 
 None of these responses is watertight. After the deluge of pro-technological 
unemployment pieces in recent years, a backlash has emerged. Several authors argue 
that the current and future impact of technology on work is being overstated (Autor 
2015a, 2015b and forthcoming; Mokyr, Vickers and Ziebarth 2015) and that there are 
 8 
other, more pressing, threats to employment (Denning 2015). More needs to be said, but 
saying it lies beyond the scope of this article. This brief summary should, nevertheless, 
enable the reader to see why people are genuinely worried about the prospect of 
technological unemployment, which technological trends are fueling this worry, and 
hence why it is worth seriously considering its social and ethical implications. That is 
what the remainder of this article will do. 
 
 
 3. The Case for Optimism in the face of Automation 
 If we assume that technological unemployment is a likely possibility, two major 
social and ethical questions arise: (i) how will people access the essential and non-
essential goods and services that currently require an income from work? and (ii) what 
will people do with their time now that they are not working?  
 
 The first question points to a distributional problem. Technological 
unemployment implies that a greater share of income will go to capital (and the owners 
of capital) than to labour. One presumes that the owners of capital will be few while the 
displaced workers will be many -- this is confirmed by recent analyses (Piketty 2014; 
Atkinson 2015; Autor 2015a). This implies greater income and social inequality. This 
can only be resolved if there is some significant redistribution of wealth from the capital 
owners to the displaced workers (or some other more drastic reorganisation of the 
economy). Many technologists and futurists have suggested that an unconditional basic 
income guarantee could resolve these problems.5 I take no view on the matter here. 
Instead, I simply assume that the distributional problem can be solved: the 
technologically unemployed future will be one of abundance, not deprivation. This is a 
significant assumption. It means that everything I say below is conditional on the 
assumption that people won’t be suffering from great hardship due to the lack of an 
income.  
 
 The second question points to a problem in personal axiology, i.e. in what makes 
life fulfilling and worthwhile for the person living it. There is a widespread view that 
                                                           
5 This is defended in Ford (2015) and Brynjolfsson & McAfee (2014), though the latter refer to the 
reverse income tax, which is effectively the same policy. Technologist and futurist James Hughes 
believes that technological unemployment provides a strategic opening for proponents of the basic 
income (2014). For further discussion of the basic income proposal, see Widerquist (2013); Widerquist et 
al (2013); van Parijs (1995); Ackerman et al (2006). 
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work is virtuous (Weeks 2011; Srnicek and Williams 2015) and the absence of paid 
employment could lead to vicious forms idleness, boredom, and depression. Working 
for a living confers a certain level of well-being and individual flourishing that would 
be absent if one did not work for a living.6 For anyone who accepts this view, there is 
much to worry about when it comes to the prospect of technological unemployment. 
There is a danger that in robbing us of the dignity of work, increasing levels of 
automation could reduce our overall levels of flourishing. The goal for the remainder of 
this article is to develop and evaluate the arguments associated with this second 
problem. 
 
 I start by defending an optimistic view which draws upon the existing antiwork 
critique of capitalist work culture.7 There are two main families of arguments that form 
the backbone of this antiwork critique. The first are what I shall call ‘work is bad’ 
arguments. These arguments claim that technological unemployment is to be welcomed 
because it will take away something that is bad for us, both individually and socially. 
The second are what I shall call ‘opportunity cost’ arguments. These arguments claim 
that technological unemployment is to be welcomed, even if work is not bad, because 
non-work is simply better. I argue that both sets of arguments become more persuasive 
in an era of technological unemployment. 
 
 The badness of work is repeatedly highlighted by antiwork theorists. Bob Black,8 
in his classic call to arms ‘The Abolition of Work’, argues that:  
 
“Work is the source of nearly all the misery in the world. Almost any evil you’d 
care to name comes from working or from living in a world designed for work. In 
order to stop suffering, we have to stop working.”  
 
(Black 1986) 
 
                                                           
6 This view is implicitly or explicitly evoked in the automation-related work of Carr (2015), Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee (2014), and Ford (2015). 
7 There is an extensive literature on this topic, examples include Lafargue (1883); Black (1986); Gorz 
(2011); Woodcock (1944); Graeber (2013); Crary (2014); Russell (2004); Levine (1995); Maskivker 
(2010); Widerquist (2013); Weeks (2011); Schwartz (1982); Srnicek and Williams (2015). 
8 Black’s work is extreme and polemical but is influential in the antiwork movement. Frayne (2015, 206-
207) notes that members of the Idler’s Alliance (an organisation seeking to resist work) ‘repeatedly 
recommended’ Black’s essay to him. 
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Similarly, Bertrand Russell suggests that ‘a great deal of harm’ is done by the belief that 
work is virtuous (2004); and Kathi Weeks (2011), in her Marxist-feminist analysis of 
work, argues that there is something puzzling about our commitment to work when it 
seems true that work itself is so bad both in terms of its quality and quantity. 
 
 But what exactly does the badness of work consist in? There are two ways to 
answer to that question. The first is to highlight certain specific and contingent 
properties of different classes of work. Thus, it can be argued that few people are happy 
with their work;9 that many forms of work are degrading and humiliating (e.g. certain 
types of erotic and care work); that some are correlated with high rates of mental illness, 
depression and suicide (e.g. social work and legal work); that some expose workers to 
unacceptable physical risks (e.g. sweatshop labour); that workplaces are sometimes rife 
with bullying, intimidation and sexual harassment; that work often leaves one exhausted 
and deflated; and so on. The exhaustive enumeration of such bad-making properties 
would, no doubt, be instructive, but also quite limited. Opponents of the antiwork view 
could just as easily highlight good-making properties of work, such as the sense of 
accomplishment and social status that comes with it (Gheaus and Herzog, forthcoming), 
and the fact that working enables one to access other social goods and services. 
 
 The problem is that the features that are typically highlighted are contingent upon 
particular forms or classes of work. Thus, even if everyone agrees that cleaning toilets is 
not the most glamorous way to make a living, they can point out that cleaning toilets is 
just one form of work among many. Indeed, one reason to embrace technological 
displacement in the workplace could be that it frees up workers to pursue more creative 
and meaningful forms of work. Thus, if we focus solely on contingent bad-making 
features of certain forms of work, we may end up welcoming some technological 
displacement, but maintaining our overall commitment to the value of work and the 
work ethic. I want to defend the more radical view that we should abandon that 
commitment. 
 
 This is where the second type of argument comes in. This one highlights bad-
making features of work that are intrinsic to the contemporary economic-political 
structure of work. That structure includes the fact that work is something that one must 
                                                           
9 In support of this one could cite the 2013 Gallup survey suggesting that only 13% of workers worldwide 
were engaged by their work. See http://www.gallup.com/poll/165269/worldwide-employees-engaged-
work.aspx (accessed 26/10/15).  
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do in order to access the basic necessities and luxuries that make life possible and worth 
living. In other words, in the contemporary economy, work is intrinsically compulsory 
in nature. This is a controversial claim and needs to be finessed. It is not that we are 
wage-slaves. We are not physically or legally obliged to work. Rather, work (and the 
pursuit of work) is a practical and economic necessity, even in the absence of physical 
or legal obligation.  
 
 Some might challenge this on the grounds that contemporary welfare states 
obviate the need for work. But such an argument would ignore the fact that most forms 
of welfare, in most states, are both insufficient for survival, and explicitly tied to the 
ability to work. One must usually prove either an active willingness to seek work, or a 
physical/mental inability to work, in order to access welfare entitlements.10 Thus, even 
in a relatively generous welfare state, one cannot escape the work ethic except through 
illness, old-age and death. It is in this way that we are all compelled to pursue work and 
to participate in a culture that glorifies work. This has at least two bad-making 
properties that could be eliminated in a postwork future. 
 
 The first is that the compulsory nature of work leads to an impoverished system of 
egalitarian justice (Levine 1995). One of the central precepts of liberal egalitarianism is 
that the state should be neutral with respect to its citizens’ conception of the good life.11 
It should not promote or force any particular conception of the good life on its citizens. 
It should work to tolerate and facilitate people in their pursuit of different conceptions 
of the good. Of course, it can only do this to the extent that a person’s conception of the 
good does not unjustly or unfairly deprive anyone else of their conception of the good. 
The key move for the antiwork proponent is to argue that non-work is a model of 
human flourishing that the neutral state should tolerate. And the problem with the 
compulsory nature of work is that it fails to tolerate and facilitate such alternative 
conceptions of the good life.  
 
                                                           
10 This ignores the recent social push toward, and limited experimentation with, unconditional basic 
income schemes. I ignore this for two reasons: (i) the rollout of such schemes is minimal and typically not 
sufficient to meet basic needs; and (ii) the increase in such schemes is arguably being driven by concerns 
about structural unemployment. 
11 Appealing to the goodness of the neutrality of the state with respect to citizens’ choice of the good life 
does not imply any particular view of whether non-work is better than work. It merely claims that the 
state should not impose a choice on its citizens. This leaves open the door to arguing that non-work would 
be the better choice. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to make this 
clarification. 
 12 
 This is sometimes defended on the grounds that the state cannot facilitate such 
lifestyle choices: doing so would result in ‘lazy’ people being supported by other hard-
working, economically productive individuals (van Parijs 1995). That would lead to 
injustice. But this is where anti-work arguments start to make more sense in an era of 
technological unemployment. If we are about to enter an era of technological 
unemployment, this allows for a re-ordering of the economic-political reality of work: 
machines can takeover the economically productive forms of labour and, provided the 
gains from this are appropriately redistributed, the ‘lazy’ lifestyle can be tolerated 
without a corresponding injustice to others.  
 
 A second, and perhaps more persuasive, argument can be found in the work of 
Julia Maskivker (2010). She argues that compulsory work is bad because it undermines 
a core value of the liberal democratic state: freedom/autonomy.12 Many people would 
agree that freedom is an essential part of the flourishing life, and compulsory work 
certainly seems to undermines it. The strength of Maskivker’s analysis lies in 
identifying three specific ways in which this happens. They are: 
 
Freedom-undermining Properties of Work: Compulsory work (i) limits our 
ability to choose how to make use of our time; (ii) limits our ability to be the 
authors of our own lives; and/or (iii) involves exploitative/coercive offers. 
 
Each of these bad-making properties deserves some scrutiny. 
 
 The problem with limiting how we can choose to spend our time is best 
understood in relation to the right to control self-ownership (Widerquist 2013). In the 
Lockean view, individuals have a right of ownership over their bodies and the fruits of 
their labour. The problem is that there are resources you need for effective self-
ownership. For example, people may need an adequate education and access to 
healthcare. Time is also an essential resource for self-ownership (Maskivker 2010). In 
fact, time is probably the ultimate resource (Zeckhauser 1973). Other skills and abilities 
only really have value when we have the time to exercise them. Furthermore, time is a 
peculiarly non-manipulable resource. There is a limited amount of time in which we get 
to act out our lives. This makes it all the more important for people to have access to 
                                                           
12 These can be understood as equivalent or distinct concepts. Gerald Dworkin (1981) argues, for 
instance, that freedom is local concept that applies to particular decisions, whereas autonomy is a global 
concept applying across a larger swathe of decision points. 
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time. The problem, as Weeks (2011) and others point out, is that work tends to 
monopolise our time. The modern knowledge-oriented workplace is particularly 
insidious in this regard.13 Modern communications technologies have broken down the 
barriers between work and leisure (Crary 2014). We are encouraged to use our time 
more productively, but also to be available to our workplaces at more times of the day. 
The death of the regular 9-to-5 workday has, if anything, encouraged work to 
monopolise more of our time. We have flexible working hours and our work is more 
outcome-driven, but the marketplaces are open 24/7 and they demand more outcomes 
from us. The result is an infiltration of work into every hour of the day. Dissolving this 
monopolisation of time is something we could look forward to in a more fully-
automated economy. 
 
 The way in which work limits our authorship of our own lives, and the badness 
this entails, is also linked to the ideal of self-ownership. To understand the idea, we 
need to think about the individual who truly enjoys their work. Such an individual 
derives great personal satisfaction and meaning from their work. In this, they seem to be 
truly owning the narrative of their lives. You could consequently argue that work has no 
bad-making properties for such an individual. But there are reasons to doubt this. 
Maskivker uses the analogy between starving and fasting to make the point. When a 
person is starving or fasting, the physical results are often the same: their bodies are 
being deprived of essential nutrients. But there is something morally distinct about the 
two cases. The person who chooses to fast has authorship over their lives; the person 
who is starving is having their story written by someone else. When it comes to work, 
there is a sense in which we are all starving not fasting. We may enjoy it, embrace it and 
endorse it, but at the end of the day we have to do it. We do not have the true authorial 
control of the faster. This is another reason to embrace technological unemployment. 
Freeing us from the necessity of work will remove a barrier to authorial control. 
 
 This brings us to the final bad-making property of work. It is related to the 
previous properties but can be treated separately. It is that work, in the modern 
economy, involves a coercive/exploitative offer. You are being asked to work ‘or else’, 
i.e. work or forgo a number of opportunities or necessities. Thus, even if work ends up 
being beneficial, it is not treating the worker as a truly autonomous agent. Some might 
                                                           
13 The way in which industrial capitalism polices and manages our times has been long discussed in the 
antiwork literature, see Woodcock (1944) 
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dispute the coercive or exploitative of the work-offer by arguing that coercive offers 
always require a threat to make you worse off than you might otherwise have been and it 
is not clear that the work-offer involves such a threat (Wertheimer 1988). The idea here 
would be that work is essential for economic productivity and that economic 
productivity raises societal well-being. In a world without compulsory work we would 
be much worse off. Thus, there is no sense in which the work-offer is threatening to 
make you worse off than you might otherwise have been.  
 
 But, again, this is one place where technological unemployment makes a real 
difference to the strength of the antiwork position. It might be true in certain social 
orders that you would be worse off without work, but in a society in which machines 
can takeover most forms of productive labour, this is much less clear. In such a society, 
work seems like, at best, an unnecessary extravagance and, at worst, a form of slow 
torture. If the gains of machine labour can be appropriately redistributed, then we are 
not worse off for not working. And, indeed, if work retains its compulsory nature in 
such a society, it would become truly coercive, within the terms set out by the likes 
Wertheimer (1988). In other words, whatever you think about this bad-making property 
of work in contemporary societies, it would be particularly acute in a world of rampant 
technological unemployment. 
 
 These ‘work is bad’ arguments can be complemented by a set of ‘opportunity 
cost’ arguments. These arguments accept that work might have many good-making 
properties but insist that non-work is better. The opportunity cost arguments have been 
implicit in the discussion thus far. They can now be made explicit. For starters, it is 
worth pointing out that one’s choice of work is always limited by what kinds of 
activities are economically viable. And the kinds of activities that are economically 
viable are dependent on where wealth is located and how that wealth is disposed 
(Graeber 2011). There is no guarantee that distribution via the labour market allow 
workers to spend their lives in the pursuits they find most fulfilling. If we could break 
the link between income and how we choose to spend our time, then we could spend our 
time in the manner that best suits our skills, desires and aptitudes. Thus, the biased 
nature of the market gives us some reason to think that non-work is preferable to work. 
 
 There are other instrumental and intrinsic reasons for thinking that non-work is 
better. Russell (2004), for instance, argues that the leisure classes (i.e. those free from 
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the necessity of work) have always been responsible for the scientific, cultural, and 
political developments that form the backbone of our civilisation. Consequently, he 
believes that freeing up more people into the leisure class will make for a better world. 
Bob Black takes a slightly different tack. He argues that the ‘ludic life’ (i.e. the playful 
life, free from work) is intrinsically better than the working one, and believes that it 
could lead to “a collective adventure in generalized joy and freely interdependent 
exuberance” (Black 1986). 
 
 These ‘opportunity cost’ arguments can be resisted on the grounds that even if the 
ludic, leisurely life is better than the working one, work itself is necessary in order to 
secure greater goods (e.g. supply of food and healthcare for all, money to pay for leisure 
activities). Or, alternatively, on the grounds that they ignore the opportunity costs of 
non-work itself. Income is not the only good we derive from work in the modern world. 
As Gheaus and Herzog (forthcoming) have recently argued, there are at least four non-
monetary goods associated with paid work: (i) excellence in the cultivation of our skills; 
(ii) contribution to society; (iii) a sense of community and (iv) social status. People 
want to be good at what they do; they want to make a difference to the world in which 
they live; they want to engage in collective enterprises; and they want to be recognised 
and validated in the eyes of their social peers. Paid work is the main forum in which 
they attain these four goods. Are we going to be cutting people off from these sources 
of meaning and flourishing in a post-work world? 
 
  I would argue that both forms of resistance are much less compelling if we are 
living through an era of technological unemployment. The prospect of near ubiquitous 
automating technologies seems to break the allegedly necessary link between work and 
these goods. Gheaus and Herzog themselves acknowledge that paid work is a privileged 
context for the attainment of the four goods they identify partly because we have to 
spend so much of our time doing it. It thus becomes the only real outlet we have for 
achieving excellence, social contribution, community and social status. But there is 
nothing intrinsic to work as I define it in this paper (performance of a skill for economic 
reward) that makes it the only forum for achieving those goods. People can, and do, 
achieve excellence, social contribution, community and status in leisure activities, 
voluntary charitable activities and hobbies. They tend not to because they are forced to 
spend their time in economically productive forms of work. If technology can take over 
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the economically productive activities, then the instrumental and intrinsic virtues of 
these non-work contexts can flourish. 
 
 That said, there is a problem with the antiwork position defended thus far. The 
combination of the ‘work is bad’ and ‘opportunity cost’ arguments do provide us with a 
robust prima facie reason to welcome technological unemployment. But there is 
something missing. In their present form, these arguments are undertheorised. In order 
to make them fully persuasive we need to consider more closely what makes for the 
good life and how exactly the absence of work will facilitate that life. When we do this, 
we end up with a more nuanced and less optimistic view. 
 
 4. How Technological Advance could undermine the Good Life 
 In this section, I refine the anti-work position by considering in more detail what 
it takes to live the good life, and by asking the question: are we sure that removing the 
incentives and motivations provided by work will allow us to live that life? To answer 
that question, it is worth considering in more detail the typical philosophical accounts of 
what makes for a meaningful life. The theories settle into four main categories:14 
 
Simple Subjectivist Theories: Hold that a life is meaningful to the extent that the 
individual living it experiences certain subjective states, typically conscious well-
being and desire satisfaction.15  
 
Simple Objective Theories: Hold that life is meaningful to the extent that the 
individual living it brings about certain objectively good or valuable states of 
affairs (Smuts 2013). These typically involve making the world a better place 
(morally speaking), producing some great scientific or intellectual discovery, or 
making great art (Metz 2010; 2013).16  
 
Aim-Achievement Theories: Hold that a combination of subjective and objective 
states are needed in order to make life meaningful. The individual should set 
                                                           
14 This categorisation is consistent with those offered by Smuts (2013) and Metz (2013), but is taken 
directly from Nyholm and Campbell (2015). 
15 Proponents of simple subjective theories include Richard Taylor (2008) though he later changed his 
view; AJ Ayer and Klemke (Nyholm & Campbell 2015 for more) 
16 Though note that Metz’s own preferred view is more akin to fitting fulfillment. 
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themselves objective goals, bring them about through their actions, and have the 
feeling of satisfaction associated with doing this, i.e. that they have an ‘aim’ and 
that they ‘achieve’ this aim (Luper 2014). 
 
Fitting-Fulfillment Theories: Hold that a combination of subjective and 
objective states are needed in order to make life meaningful. They are similar to 
the aim-achievement theories in that they insist on the individual being 
subjectively satisfied by bringing about some objective end. Where they differ is 
in thinking that the objective end must be one that is objectively good or 
objectively valuable, i.e. fitting (Wolf 2010; Metz 2010; Wielenberg 2005). 
 
We can use these theories to flesh out the opportunity cost argument in favour of 
technological displacement. There are two points to be made. First, under a simple 
subjectivist theory, there is reason to think that technological unemployment could 
enhance the overall level of meaning in our lives, but only if we make use of the right 
kinds of technological advances. Second, in relation to all the remaining theories of 
meaning (objective and hybrid) there is reason to think that technological 
unemployment could undermine the overall level of meaning in our lives, but this 
impact could lessened with the right kind of technological developments. These two 
arguments need to be unpacked. 
 
 
 4.1 - The Subjective Satisfaction of Non-Work 
 Let’s start with the simple subjectivist argument. Simple subjectivist theories lurk 
behind many of the anti-work arguments outlined above. The idea is that compulsory 
work takes us away from the things that we are really passionate about and that would 
confer upon us the most subjective satisfaction. Even if we are lucky enough to work at 
something we genuinely enjoy we must bear in mind that others are not so lucky.  
Things would be much better, subjectively speaking, if we could spend our time as we 
saw fit. The attraction is obvious. As I sit here writing this article, I often think to 
myself of other activities I could be performing which would be much more 
subjectively fulfilling. I could be out swimming or bike riding; I could be reading a 
book or working on that novel I have always wanted to write. But I cannot do these 
things because the productivist ethos of modern academia demands that I produce more 
peer-reviewed publications to pad out my CV. 
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 This argument assumes that if we control our own time we will spend it in a way 
that induces the right subjective states. This assumption is cast into doubt by findings in 
psychology. Dan Gilbert’s work on mis-wanting, for example, suggests that we often 
don’t really know what makes us truly happy and often stumble upon happiness (Gilbert 
2005; Gilbert et al 1998; Gilbert et al 2004). Findings like this can be exploited by 
critics of automation and technological unemployment. A recent example of this is Carr 
(2015). Carr contends that without the pressures and incentives of work we may live a 
life of listless and unsatisfied boredom.  
 
 In making this argument, Carr focuses on the role of ‘flow states’ in subjective 
well-being. Flow states are states of total immersion in a task or activity. They were first 
described by Mihaly Cskikszentmihalyi (1990; 1997; 2007) and are characterised by 
strong positive affective experience (sometimes described as being rapturous or joyful). 
If any psychological state is a candidate for the subjective basis for meaning, a flow 
state would seem to be it. The problem is that Cskikszentmihalyi’s studies suggest that 
people are much more likely to enter flow states at work than they are at leisure. 
Cskikszentmihalyi and colleagues have used experience sampling methods (2007) to 
interrupt people during either work or play, and get them to answer questions about 
their overall levels of personal satisfaction and well-being. These studies reveal that 
people are generally more focused, happier and more satisfied at work than at play. 
Indeed, they often report feeling anxious and bored outside of work when they are 
presumably free to engage in their preferred activities. All this despite the fact that they 
still claim, when asked, to prefer play to work. This creates the so-called ‘paradox of 
work’.  
 
 Carr thinks the reason for this ‘paradox’ is obvious. Cskikszentmihalyi’s theory 
holds that entering into a flow state is a function of how difficult the task is and how 
much pressure is associated with it. A simple task with no associated pressure is 
unlikely to generate a flow state; the same goes for a task that is too difficult and comes 
with too much pressure. Moderate-to-high levels of pressure and difficulty are needed. 
Work is often an excellent way to provide the right kind of pressure and difficulty. If 
left to our own devices, we may not push ourselves hard enough. There is, 
consequently, reason to doubt whether, in the absence of work, we will spend our free 
time engaged in more subjectively fulfilling activities.  
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  There are two problems with this argument. The first has to do with the empirical 
basis for the claim that without work we would be less likely to engage in flow-state-
inducing activities. There is a limited utility to studies, such as Cskikszentmihalyi’s, 
which compare work and leisure in a world that is dominated by work. When I come 
home from a busy day at the office, I’m usually drained and lethargic. I’m often not 
physically able to engage in the kinds of activity I would prefer. I’m conscious of the 
fact that I need to recover before going back to the office again. In an era of rampant 
technological unemployment, in which the shadow of work is removed, things could be 
very different.17  
 
 The second problem with Carr’s argument is that it makes a dubious assumption 
about the link between work and the kinds of pressures that are needed to induce flow 
states. It is paternalistic to assume that people will lack sufficient self-motivation if they 
are unemployed. This paternalism is behind much of the traditional ideological 
glorification of the work ethic. But worse than that, this argument ignores non-work 
related pressures and motivations that could be leveraged to similar effect. I can set 
difficult personal goals and publicly commit to them in a manner that will prove costly 
(e.g. in terms of reputational loss or damage) if I fail to achieve them. This could well 
provide the pressure needed for entering into flow states. Indeed, people do this all the 
time, for example, by committing to run marathons by raising funds for charity, or by 
committing to change their habits by entering into pacts or agreements with their 
friends. What’s more, the argument ignores the ways in which modern technology can 
greatly assist in providing these alternative sources of pressure. Social networking and 
gamification apps, for instance, can provide the pressures and rewards needed to push 
ourselves out of our comfort zone and engage in the kinds of activity that are more 
likely to induce flow states. 
 
 So although the simple subjectivist argument in favour of technological 
unemployment can be naive, there are ways to correct for this naivety by employing the 
right kinds of social/technological support for leisure activities. But even this revised 
subjectivist argument should not be pushed too far. There are two reasons for this. First, 
purely subjectivist theories of meaning are implausible. The classic counterexample is 
the story of Sisyphus pushing his boulder up a hill for eternity. Suppose he derives 
                                                           
17 I would like to thank KS for helping me to make this argument. 
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immense personal satisfaction from getting it to the top and the satisfaction remains the 
same no matter how often he repeats the task. Here, Sisyphus is living a subjectively 
satisfying life, but there is nothing deeply meaningful about it. We need something 
more for that.  
  
 Second, and linked to this problem, although technology could be leveraged in 
ways that make us more likely to achieve flow states through our activities, there are 
also ways in which we could use technology to trick ourselves into such subjectively 
pleasurable states without any associated activity. ‘Wireheading’ technologies may be 
feasible in an era of technological employment (Pearce 1995). These would utilise brain 
implants to induce profound feelings of joy and satisfaction. The kinds of lives lived 
with such technological assistance might be incredibly subjectively satisfying, but they 
wouldn’t seem to embody the qualities of the good life as traditionally conceived. In 
short, if we are to think seriously about meaning and personal fulfillment in an age of 
technological unemployment, we probably need to take into consideration the link 
between our actions and the objective world, and how technology might mediate the 
relationship between our actions and the objective world. 
 
 4.2 - Could technology sever our link with objective sources of meaning? 
 This is something that the three remaining theories of meaning encourage us to 
do. Each of them stresses the need for individual activity and subjectivity to join-up 
with consequences in the external world. The simple objectivist theory demands that our 
actions be causally responsible for objectively good outcomes (Smuts 2013), 
irrespective of whether we appreciate or understand that our actions are responsible for 
those outcomes. The other two theories — aim-achievement and fitting-fulfillment — 
also demand that our actions be causally responsible for objective outcomes, but add to 
this the requirement that we be subjectively aware of this, and satisfied and fulfilled by 
our achievements. The aim-achievement theory, in the form defended by Steven Luper 
(2014), allows for objectively wicked/evil outcomes to facilitate a meaningful life, 
provided that the individual aimed for and achieved those outcomes. This strikes me, 
and many others (Wolf 2010; Metz 2010; and Wielenberg 2005), as unsatisfactory, so 
from here I will assume that the link must be with objectively good outcomes. That 
said, most of what I am about to say applies equally to the achievement of bad outcomes 
because the central question is whether it is more or less likely that we will be able to 
achieve outcomes in a world of rampant technological unemployment? 
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 A naive argument claims that it is more likely. We see this at play in some of the 
antiwork positions outlined above. Take Russell’s claim (2004) that the leisure class 
has, historically, been responsible for all that is good in the world (art; scientific 
discovery; moral good works; political development). This claim rests on the belief that 
in the absence of work we will be more likely to engage in the activities that produce 
objectively good outcomes. This is often tied to the claim that the market can distort or 
bias human activity towards outcomes that are profitable but not necessarily objectively 
good. Consequently, there is reason to think that technological unemployment, by 
freeing us from these distorting influences, will allow us to engage in the kinds of 
activities that are essential to the good life. 
 
 This argument is naive for at least two reasons. First, it is too dismissive of the 
potential for the market to direct human activity towards objectively valuable outcomes. 
Economists have long lauded the moral potential of the market. Markets can ensure 
efficient distribution of social goods; and they can increase the size of the social ‘pie’. 
They can also incentivise the kinds of activity that are thought to be conducive to the 
good life. These include the production of art and intellectual discovery, both of which 
are subject to significant market forces in the modern world. If automating technology 
renders human contribution to such market-based activities unnecessary, then we may 
be robbed of something that is conducive to the good life.  
 
 But this objection is not entirely compelling since the antiwork camp will simply 
respond by saying that nonwork is better at allowing us to do these things. This is the 
second respect in which the antiwork argument is naive. It assumes that the kinds of 
technological advance that make widespread technological unemployment possible will 
occur in a vacuum — that the impact of automating technologies will be felt solely in 
our economic lives. This is highly unlikely. Indeed, we can already see ways in which 
automating and assistive technologies infiltrate our moral, artistic, intellectual and 
political lives. If this trend continues, and we rely on those technologies in these other 
domains, we could sever the necessary causal and mental link between our actions and 
the outcomes that are said to be constitutive of meaning.  
 
 Some concrete illustrations can be used to underscore this argument. Suppose the 
hope is that in the absence of work we will be free to use our creativity in pursuit of 
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intellectual discovery and moral betterment. Suppose the hope is that we will be able 
understand more deeply the mysteries of human biology, in particular the causes and 
progression of cancer. This hope may be forlorn. As with most contemporary 
biosciences, cancer pathology is increasingly reliant upon machine-learning algorithms 
to analyse large datasets and identify useful patterns in those datasets. These algorithms 
are now demonstrating creativity and reaching useful conclusions that are surprising to 
their original human creators. A good example of this is the use of the C-Path algorithm 
to improve our understanding of the prognosis of breast cancer. The algorithm 
discovered that better predictions could be made by analysing the structural tissue 
around cancerous cells rather than by analysing the cancerous cells themselves. This 
was not expected by the original researchers and programmers (Beck et al 2011). They 
may have created the technology, but they did not ultimately control the discovery. 
What is true of the study of cancer pathology is becoming true of science more 
generally. Science is increasingly a ‘big data’ enterprise, reliant on algorithmic, and 
other forms of automated assistance, to process large datasets and make useful 
inferences from those datasets. Humans are becoming increasingly irrelevant to the 
process of discovery. 
 
 But that’s just scientific discovery, what about other areas of activity that lead to 
valuable outcomes? Suppose, once you are freed from the shackles of work, you want to 
address some moral problem. Suppose you want to ensure that certain resources are 
distributed more fairly or more efficiently. You might think that this is a space in which 
your activity can be causally responsible for good outcomes. But this too is becoming 
less and less clear. For example, matching algorithms can and are being used to 
efficiently and fairly distribute resources. Kidney exchanges are a good example (Roth 
2015; Vulkan et al 2013; and Sonmez & Unver 2013). No one doubts that it is 
objectively good that people are allowed to live longer through organ transplants. But 
there is also a widely acknowledged deficit in the number of willing (or deceased) 
donors. Furthermore, even when there is a willing donor, they are often not a match for 
their intended donee. Matching algorithms can help to solve this problem (Roth 2015; 
Sonmez & Unver 2013). Using large databases of patient and donor profiles, they can 
be used to link together matching pairs, thereby kickstarting long chains or cycles of 
organ donation.  
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 What is true in relation to organ donation is (and will be) true of other moral 
enterprises. Energy and food distribution (in addition to production) can be improved 
through algorithmic and automated systems (Rifkin 2014). And many legal-bureaucratic 
enterprises can be too (Pasquale 2015). Governments are increasingly turning to such 
systems to perform tasks like identifying terrorist suspects, stolen identities, tax cheats, 
and likely repeat offenders. These systems can be tireless; and some argue (Zarsky 
2012) that they are free from the distorting biases of human beings (though this is hotly 
contested). These systems often still involve human actors, and given the nature of 
democratic political processes probably always will, but the roles of the humans will 
become more passive, less creative and interactive. The machines start doing much of 
the work themselves; the logic of their decision-making becomes more and more 
opaque to those who interact with them.18 Thus, once again, the rise of automation 
reduces the space in which humans can engage in meaningful and fulfilling moral 
activities. 
 
 Now, you might dispute this characterisation. You might argue that there is still 
room for human input in all of these automated systems. For one thing, such systems 
would seem to require human designers, programmers and overseers; for another, 
humans would still have to contribute to the smooth functioning of such systems, e.g. 
by becoming kidney donors or by providing crucial data. Thus, individuals can be 
linked to objective outcomes in the appropriate manner. But there are three problems 
with this argument.  
 
 First, not everyone is going to be equipped or trained to design or program such 
systems. At the very least, there needs to be a massive shift in education and training so 
as to allow people to do so — mere freedom from work will not solve the problem. 
Furthermore, even if people do have the necessary training and skills, modern 
information technology and globalisation is such that relatively few people are needed 
to solve moral distributional problems of the sort just mentioned. This is because of the 
winner takes all phenomenon that was discussed earlier in the article.  
 
 The second problem is that advances in technology may be such that human 
designers, programmers and overseers will become less needed over time. Automated 
technologies may become sufficiently advanced that they can maintain, upgrade and 
                                                           
18 I defend this view of future governance systems at much greater length in [reference omitted] 
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develop themselves without human oversight. Thus, even if human creators start these 
systems, the systems may advance in a way that breaks any meaningful link between 
those original creators and the outcomes of the system. Indeed, this is already 
happening, as hinted at by the creative discoveries of the C-Path algorithm. It may also 
be what happens in the political domain. Humans may still be voted into office to 
ostensibly oversee technological governance systems, but they may have limited ability 
to second-guess and intervene. 
 
 Finally, even if humans will always participate in such systems, the participation 
in question has to be of the right type in order to facilitate meaningfulness in the 
objective or hybridist sense. In current kidney exchange systems, humans still have to 
make the decision to become donors, and this requires some moral courage. Those who 
become donors can genuinely claim to make the world a better place. The same is true 
for the (still largely human) surgical teams that perform the operations. But how long 
will this be true? If the promise of artificially generating replacement organs using a 
combination of stem cells and 3D printing comes true, and if surgery itself becomes 
almost fully automated, the sole remaining participation for human beings will be as 
beneficiaries of automated systems. This may make them subjectively better off, but 
they will no longer be agents or creators of objective outcomes. Again, the necessary 
causal link is severed. 
 
 It is important that this argument is not misunderstood. The claim is that the kinds 
of machines that make widespread technological unemployment possible are also likely 
to be better (more accurate, more efficient, less prone to distortion or bias) at attaining 
the True and the Good. These still remain as sources of objective meaning. And 
allowing machines to attain those objectives will probably make our lives subjectively 
better. But the objectives will no longer be ours. That is the sense in which the link is 
severed.  
 
 There are two further objections to this argument.19 The first is that even if 
machines are better at achieving certain objective outcomes there is nothing to stop 
humans from achieving them too. If they succeed they will have satisfied the requisite 
conditions for meaning. This is true, but only up to a point. In the technologically 
advanced future a human could still develop the ability to, say, design and engineer a 
                                                           
19 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on these two issues. 
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bridge or cure a medical illness, but because the machines are better at doing both of 
these things there are likely to be a significant personal and social disincentives against 
doing so: why would you waste time and risk lives if the machines are better?  
 
 The second objection is that this argument commits something akin to the Luddite 
fallacy: it assumes that if machines get better and better at doing things they will take 
away from the fixed lump of potentially meaningful activities that are open to human 
beings. But why couldn’t more and more objectively meaningful activities open up? 
This has an air of plausibility but it seems like it is vulnerable to the same objections as 
the original Luddite fallacy. Some moral and intellectual objectives will suffer from an 
inelasticity of demand problem: there will be a limit to how much demand there is for 
insight or resolution, e.g. a grand unified theory of physics or the eradication of hunger 
and disease. The superstar/winner-takes-all effect will mean that new fields of 
opportunity will be quickly gobbled up. And exponential progress in technology will 
mean that humans are not able to redirect their skills and attention fast enough. 
 
 In the end, the only domain in which humans might be able to meaningfully 
contribute to objective outcomes would be in the realm of private, ludic or aesthetic 
activities, e.g. in producing works of art, or pursuing games, hobbies and sports.  In 
these aesthetic domains, it is less clear that automating technologies help to produce 
better outcomes. We could get computers to create music and visual art or play sports 
— (in fact, we already can) — but it’s not clear that this adds to the aesthetic value in 
the world or detracts from the value of our own pursuits in those domains. But there is 
still ample space for automation in our private lives (e.g. in the shape of digital 
assistants or robot helpers) and these devices could sap us of some of the motivation 
and ability to engage in acts of private or aesthetic meaning. We also need to ask 
whether this remaining domain is enough? Metz (2010) argues that the Good, the True 
and the Beautiful are the three major domains of meaning in human life. In the 
hypothetical future just sketched, we are left, in effect, with the Beautiful. That certainly 
looks like a more impoverished form of existence. 
 
 5. An Integrationist Approach to Technology 
 The problem identified at the end of the last section concerns the human 
relationship with automating technologies. I argued that if meaning and fulfillment are 
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at least partly determined by how our individual activities join up with the external 
world, then there is something to worry about if automating technologies takeover most 
domains of human activity. They could sever the necessary links between what we do 
and what happens in the world. In making this argument, I was highlighting a potential 
flaw in our relationship with technology. To a large extent, we still view technology as 
something external to us: as a tool for shaping and reshaping the world. For most of 
human history, those technological tools were controlled and manipulated by human 
hands and minds. So there was a sense in which they empowered our own 
achievements. But with the growth of automation and AI, this becomes less and less 
true. The tools have become ever more externalised. It is this externalisation that looks 
like the major threat to continued meaning and fulfillment. 
 
 Perhaps there are other ways in which we could relate to technology? Instead of 
pursuing a strategy of increased externalisation, perhaps we could pursue increased 
integration. In other words, perhaps we could merge ourselves (our bodies; our minds) 
with technology. Perhaps we could become cyborgs . That way, the systems that I 
lamented towards the end of the previous section would no longer threaten to sever the 
link between what we do and what can be achieved. They would be integrated into who 
we are. We could have the best of both worlds: the benefits of the enhanced capacities 
of technology along with meaningful participation in the outcomes the technology 
facilitates. This is admittedly speculative, and I do not have the scope in this article to 
map out the possible forms of integration, but some of the possibilities are already 
apparent (Gunkel 2012 & 2015; Haraway 1991; Schermer 2009). I presume the 
necessary integration would involve increased use of brain-computer interfaces, 
nanotechnology and various other neuroprosthetic devices. The precise mix and form 
would need to be debated and specified.   
 
 To be clear, I am not claiming here that the integrationist project will be easy and 
risk-free. Integrating ourselves with technology always poses risks and if the project is 
to be pursued it must be pursued with due caution and wisdom. What I am claiming is 
that there could be benefits to be reaped from doing so. That said, there are two more 
specific critiques of this suggestion that are worth addressing. The first draws its 
inspiration from defenders of the extended mind thesis; the second focuses on a 
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problematic assumption underlying the entire argument thus far, namely the ‘primacy of 
the real’.20 
 
 The extended mind thesis is the claim that the human mind already naturally 
extends into technological artifacts. The concept originates in a paper by Clark and 
Chalmers (1998). They argued that functionalist theories of mind support the notion that 
the human mind can be realised across multiple physical systems. To support this, they 
gave a thought experiment involving a man named Otto who had some form amnesia 
and used a notebook to store and recall various memories. They argued that Otto’s 
memory recall system was functionally equivalent to that of someone who used their 
brain to store and recall memories. The only difference was that Otto’s mind extended 
into a (primitive and simplistic) technological artifact. Clark and others have developed 
this idea to suggest that humans are constantly extending their minds, and that devices 
like smartphones and digital assistants can all form part of their extended minds.  
 
 This thesis can be used to challenge, or at least modify, my suggestion that we 
should pursue an integrationist relationship with technology. When I use the term 
‘integration’, I imagine a future in which technology is directly integrated into 
biological systems. But according to proponents of the extended mind thesis there is a 
sense in which we have already integrated ourselves with technology. The AI and 
automating technologies that I mentioned above are already parts of our extended 
minds. We don’t need to go any further. We have the link we need. The extended mind 
thesis is certainly an intriguing philosophical claim, but it is dubious as to whether it can 
restore the link between individual activity and outcomes. For one thing, it is a 
controversial philosophical thesis with plenty of critics (Menary 2010). More 
importantly, it is not clear that such technologies give us the right kinds of ownership, 
control or phenomenological connection with the outcomes they facilitate. There are 
important phenomenological differences between solving a mathematical puzzle by 
oneself and doing so with the assistance of a calculator. If we design and programme 
extended mind technologies for ourselves, then perhaps we could retain some form of 
the necessary. But as has been argued already, it is not clear whether individuals will do 
such things in the automated future. 
 
                                                           
20 I take this term from JP and TK 
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 The second objection is that in endorsing this integrationist approach, and in 
claiming that technology could sever the link between our activities and the external 
world, I have been making a dubious axiological assumption. I have been assuming that 
outcomes in the real world are the only type that are sufficient for sustaining a 
meaningful life. But why must the outcomes be in the real world? One thing we may be 
able to do in the technological future is create vast virtual worlds in which all manner of 
activities can be pursued and outcomes realised. Indeed, we could be almost infinitely 
creative in terms of how we set the parameters for existence in those worlds. Is it not 
some biased assumption in favour of the real world that denies the meaningfulness of 
such activities? 
 
 This too is an intriguing possibility, but there are some obvious objections to it. 
Robert Nozick’s Experience Machine argument is the best-known (Nozick 1974). The 
argument is premised on a thought experiment in which you are given the choice 
between a qualitatively superior virtual-world life and a qualitatively inferior real-world 
life. Nozick’s intuition was that, given the choice, people would choose the latter over 
the former. The suggestion then being that reality has primacy over virtuality when it 
comes to what counts for the good life. Although this strikes many as a persuasive 
argument, recent results in experimental philosophy cast doubt upon the strength of the 
intuitions Nozick uses to power his argument (de Brigard 2010). Studies suggest that 
Nozick’s thought experiment may simply be exploiting a status quo bias, and that if you 
change the scenario so that people are asked to ‘plug out’ of a virtual reality that they 
enjoy, instead of plugging into one (as in Nozick’s original experiment), most people 
prefer to stick with what they’ve got.  
 
 The full implications of these experiments, and the persuasiveness of Nozick’s 
argument, are still being debated. I find myself drawn to Nozick’s original argument, 
and so I think the integrationist solution remains preferable, but suppose for present 
purposes I concede that actions in a purely virtual world might suffice for meaning. In 
that case, it would follow that we need to think carefully about the future into which we 
are wandering. If virtual reality is our best hope, then this kind of technology needs to 
be prioritised and made available to all. That may be the only way to solve the deficit in 
meaning that other forms of technological advancement open up. 
 
 29 
 
 6. Conclusion 
 This article has taken a number of twists and turns. It is probably worth 
concluding by summarising and drawing together the main lines of argumentation. Four 
points seem particularly worthy of emphasis. First, assuming that technological 
unemployment is a real possibility in the not-too-distant future, there are two main 
ethical and social problems to which it could give rise: (i) the distributional problem, 
arising from the fact that more income goes to capital owners; and (ii) the problem in 
personal axiology, arising from the fact that people need to do something with the time 
they no longer spend working. 
 
 Second, I argued although many people celebrate the virtues and pleasures of 
work and the work ethic, there are reasons to think that working to fill our economic 
needs is sub-optimal. For one thing, there are a variety of contingent and intrinsic harms 
associated with work, and for another there are reasons to think that there are better 
ways in which we could spend our time. This is the antiwork position. 
 
 Third, I tempered this enthusiasm for the antiwork position by assessing the 
possibilities of non-work in light of the four leading theories of what makes for a 
meaningful and fulfilling life. I argued that there was some reason to be optimistic if 
you embraced a purely subjectivist theory of meaning; but some reason for pessimism if 
you embraced an objective or hybridist theory of meaning. The reason for pessimism 
was that technological advances do not occur in a vacuum: the kinds of technological 
advance that make structural unemployment possible may sever the connection between 
human activity and meaningful outcomes across a number of domains. 
 
 Fourth, and finally, I suggested that one way to address this problem was to 
endorse an integrationist, as opposed to an externalist, approach to our relationship to 
technology. This would not be a straightforward or easy project, but it may need to be 
prioritised in order to address the meaning-deficit made possible by advances in 
automation. 
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